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AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY

VOL. XXIX, 3.

WHOLE NO. 115.

I.—STAHL'S SYNTAX OF THE GREEK VERB.

FIRST ARTICLE.

Prolegomena.

No one can appreciate the value of Stahl's Syntax of the Greek Verb so well as one who has worked on the same lines for as many years as Stahl has done and on the same general principle of direct study of the monuments of the language.¹ All honor to the untiring industry that has accumulated a mass of material which puts to shame many a specialist. All honor to the intellectual courage that undertakes to erect a new system on the basis of personal research. Special acknowledgments to his predecessors there are none and with a touch of national arrogance Stahl claims to have bettered his instructions everywhere. To verify this statement, to compare his treatment with that of the long list of syntacticians from Apollonios down to the latest file-closer of the psychological school, would be a task not unworthy of one who has the leisure for such a survey; and in a recent number of the Journal I made some such promise: but my time is short, and the best I can do under the circumstances is to summarize the book so far as that is possible in the compass of two or three articles. If, in the course of this summary, I refer to my own writings, it is not because I claim for my performances any startling originality but because these references will show that my previous studies have given me some right to an opinion on the points discussed.

¹ *Kritisch-historische Syntax des griechischen Verbums der klassischen Zeit* von J. M. Stahl. Heidelberg, Carl Winter, 1907.

In the preface we are told that this is the first thorough historical treatment of the subject, the first comprehensive study of the growth, or, 'wenn das hübscher lautet', the *Werdeprozess* of the syntax of the Greek verb. True, to use his own figure, the sphygmograph that registers the beating of the pulse of language does not everywhere present so consecutive and so satisfactory a record as in the moods, but wherever any movement can be felt, the sphygmograph must be applied. <Unfortunately the sphygmograph is itself a throbbing finger, and the observer is apt to confound the beat of his own heart with the pulse of that very tricky personification, language.>

Now here at the threshold one pauses to remark that the history of a growth like language is not to be followed like the growth of a chick. We are in a world of conventions from the very beginning (A. J. P. XXIII 128). Our earliest monument of the Greek language brings us face to face with just such a world, face to face with a language that is not speech (A. J. P. XXIV 353). Nothing can be more futile than the assumption that the first emergence of a construction in literature is conclusive evidence of its date in speech (A. J. P. III 197; IV 434, 443). And yet this assumption vitiates much of the work that has been done in the historical line. Our early literature is all poetical, all the product of the school. The pulses are carefully regulated by the beat of the metre. You have *ιδέσθαι* and you yearn for the participle. Yearn as much as you choose, *ιδόμενος* is withheld. 'Quod versu dicere non est' holds for Homer as for Horace. 'On saute dans un cerceau', to borrow a phrase from Barbey d'Aurevilly. Our first great prose writer is as artificial, or if you choose, as artistic, as our first great poet. Inscriptions are precious, but most of our inscriptions are under the ban of legal formulae, and when the Greek took the graver in hand, the native flow of his blood was checked. We cannot trust the sphygmograph. We may speculate but we must not dogmatize, and yet what would a grammarian be, if he were not dogmatic?

Next we are told that this supreme achievement of Stahl's differs from its predecessors by its critical point of view. Other scholars have grazed these questions, have actually studied the texts they were citing with some regard to their soundness, but Stahl has excelled them all in the thoroughness of his study, the fulness of his discussion and the magisterial maintenance of his opinions. Opponents he never mentions, for he abhors po-

lemics. On questions of textual criticism he turns his thumb at times and mentions the name as he turns it; but his condemnation as well as his acceptance of current views is impersonal, and the man he means must be content to bite his thumb in response. He is in debt to his predecessors. Who is not? He has appropriated Delbrück's view as to the original signification of subjunctive and optative, and Windisch's view of the relative as an anaphoric demonstrative. But these are disputed views and Stahl claims to have improved on the arguments of the originators and thus made their theories his own. The ordinary text-books have failed to satisfy him. What specialist have they ever satisfied? The various monographs have likewise come short so far as he has condescended to read them. To him they were largely unnecessary, for he has gone back to the sources. A shining example, doubtless, but for the honor of our craft let us cherish the belief that it is not a solitary one.¹

Of course, working through all the authors, all the fragments, all the inscriptions over the whole range of syntax, over the whole extent of Greek literature was impossible even for the superhuman powers of a Stahl and so he has wisely limited himself to the verb and to the period that stops at Aristotle. Having done this independently, he felt himself able to renounce the study of all the monographic literature, though he believes that he has not overlooked anything of importance. To the Schanz series, however, he is indebted for much help, and he is very grateful for it. Of cis-Atlantic work he makes no special note though cis-Atlantic work has not altogether escaped the attention of the authors of the Schanz series, or of men like Brugmann and Delbrück. Not averse to statistics is Stahl but, as he gives no authorities, one is left to infer that he has done the whole work again for himself. To judge by the industry that has brought together an unparalleled wealth of illustrative material, he is perfectly capable of having done it and I, for one, will not dispute his claim to independence here also.

¹ Um Krüger's Gründlichkeit und Ausdauer bei dem Studium der einzelnen Schriftsteller behufs Ausarbeitung seiner Grammatik zu charakterisieren will ich nur aus seinem Handexemplar des Aristophanes die auf dem Vorblatte befindliche Notiz anführen: Sommer 1840 am 8. August den Ar. zum zweiten M. in diesem Jahre durchgelesen, 13. Aug. zum dritten, 21. Aug. zum vierten, 27. zum fünften Mal—Poekel, K. W. Krügers Lebensabriss, 1885, p. 21. Das war ein Mann, den möchte man mit den Nägeln aus der Erde kratzen, as was said of Fabricius (A. J. P. X 383).

In his Methodology Stahl takes up the different methods of syntactical study, the Empirical, which collects and sorts the facts and in this way arrives at mechanical rules that have no reasoned basis. This is the oldest form and is valuable so far as it goes, but is not scientific. The second is the Logical Method, which gives the logical content of the syntactical forms of expression. And there it stops or ought to stop. We are not to impose logical categories on language. Language and thought are not coëxtensive. We have to reckon with feeling and fancy, the sentimentality of concord between adjective and substantive, the absurdities and inconsistencies of grammatical gender <things discarded by our logical and practical English>. As a specimen of illogicality on the part of Greek, Stahl cites the use of the past tense to express unreality. 'If anything is real', he says, 'it is the past'. <But what we call unreality is past opportunity, the Tantalus suspense that becomes eternal. The imperfect needs no *ἄν* to make it unreal. The psychologists claim the past as well as the future for potentiality¹ and the phenomenon is one of perpetual recurrence, so that Stahl might have selected a better example for a specific Greek manifestation.>

Then he goes on to say that strict logical definitions of the functions of the forms are impossible. We can only speak of an *a potiori* use. The so-called parts of speech are not to be taken too seriously. Noun and verb, adjective and substantive, active and passive, mood and tense often behave in a scandalous way <that can only be fitly described in Biblical language. Aholahs and Aholibahs are they all. They are as inconsequent as a French cocotte (A. J. P. XXIII 130), and their choppings and changings are not to be regulated by categories. And yet *a potiori* has its rights, and we must be thankful to Stahl for allowing us to use the old terms; for much that we call style—and my chief interest in syntax is frankly stylistic—depends in large measure on these deviations from the accustomed track, these leapings over the wall (A. J. P. XXIII 6)>.

Logic does not suffice, but the logic-chopper blazes the way for the historian. Language does not stand still and we cannot stand still to amplify with Stahl what was a trite observation in the days of Horace. Language is a living organism and the rest of it. It develops, it evolves, and it is our business to follow the

¹ J. van Ginneken, *Principes de linguistique psychologique*, p. 97.

stages of its historical development, its organic evolution, which Stahl like the rest supposes to be absolutely coincident with chronological manifestation in literature. It lies in the nature of language that in the course of time it should tend to greater clearness and definiteness <and it is a thousand pities that writers on syntax do not avail themselves more freely of the facilities afforded by this evolution>. So long as language lived only in oral use and served the purpose of oral communication, much was left unexpressed, much had to be supplied by tone and gesture. Language lacking tone and gesture was forced to be more exact. The intellectual life became richer, the interpretation of thought finer and more complicated, until at the last we reach such a consummation as we have in Stahl. <But tone and gesture are still needed to interpret language. Else the actor's occupation were gone. Attic has lost subtleties that are no subtleties to Homer. 'Yea' and 'Nay' are slumped with 'Yes' and 'No' in modern English—a matter that roused the ire of Sir Thomas More,—and foreigners are apt to slump *oui* and *si*.> The language of the early time, Stahl goes on to say in no unfamiliar strain, puts the simple thoughts of that day side by side, the richer life of thought requires a more complex arrangement. Parataxis is followed by hypotaxis (A. J. P. XXIV 390, 391). 'All this is readily traced', says Stahl. But where? In the literature, which shows a decrease of parataxis, an increase of hypotaxis. <But where? Where the laws of style demand it. All this goes beyond our historical record. To reproduce the early conditions we have to study the language of the people, the language of children, our own consciousness of the process of thought (Nutting, *The Order of Conditional Thought*, A. J. P. XXIV 25 foll.; 149 foll.; 278 foll.), and the answers are very unsatisfactory. One recalls what Quintilian says, I. O. 3, 96: *Non ut quidque primum dicendum, ita primum cogitandum*. As our everyday speech is full of the fossils of dead philosophies, so we have inherited turns of expression that defy analysis. We accept the traditional totalities as totalities. The Roman did not analyze *quin* (A. J. P. XXIII 138). We do not analyze *but*.>

'With the development of the departments of literature', says Stahl, 'differences arise'. There is one kind of syntax for poetry, another kind of syntax for prose. Tragedy and comedy differ, oratory and history (A. J. P. XXIII 6). For the understanding of all this the empirico-logical method is impotent. It puts a

definite period of the language as a basis and counts as exceptions everything that varies from that. <And yet something is to be said in behalf of those who demand a *ποῦ στῶ* for any study of a language. The modern psychological study of language begins with the spoken language of to-day and sentences are made up—sentences which are sometimes ungrammatical—in order to illustrate the psychological processes of grammar. We have no such basis for the study of ancient Greek, and beginning with Homer has shown itself to be as unpractical as beginning with Chaucer would be for the acquisition of English. The best thing we can do is to take a point of reference, the conventional language (S. C. G. iv) which must have been understood by the people, even if it was not spoken by the people. Unless we have a standard there is no enjoyment in deviation. When Lindsay tells us that the rules of our grammars will not answer for Plautus throughout, we rejoice with exceeding joy, but we should not abandon our rules for all that, for we find after all that Plautus hews closer to the Ciceronian line than we should have supposed *a priori*. No one who has a right to an opinion about Greek syntax is a rigid uniformitarian, but we have each his own weakness, and as we shall see, Stahl is as relentless in some directions as he is liberal in others.>

The importance of the Comparative Method—really a part of the Historical Method—is recognized by Stahl, especially in the doctrine of the cases in which the comparison of kindred languages enables us to understand the syncretism of the dative with its triple element, of the genitive which carries the ablative in its bosom, so that we can separate and must separate the instrumental dative and the local dative from the personal dative and the ablative genitive from the genitive proper. <Can we? Must we? The doctrine of the syncretism of the cases goes back to Quintilian (A. J. P. XXIII 20) and what goes back to Quintilian goes much farther back, and I venture to say that the problem of assignment is one of the most puzzling that the student has to encounter, especially when that student has to face the ultimate question, which is not what analysis reveals to us but what synthesis has to say to those who used the language. It is the quest of the originals of the composite photograph, and, so far from being a mere matter of theory, the problem stares one in the face whenever we apply the practical test of translation (A. J. P. XXIII 21). Mr. Mackail has won great renown by his translations. I have

given up the practice of that difficult art, to which I was once addicted (cf. Pindar I. E. xxvii; A. J. P. XIII 517; XXI 108; XXII 104 al.); and I am happy to learn from those who are more gifted, for it is a gift. On the very first pages of his Anthology he renders (The Garland of Meleager, v. 10) *Νοσσιδος ἧς δέλοις κηρόν ἔτηξεν* *Ἐρωσ* 'Nossis, on whose tablets Love melted the wax'. The syntactician mindful of his Meisterhans,³ p. 209, might have a word to say in favour of 'for whose tablets Love melted wax'. In poetry the local dative is never to be preferred if the personal dative will serve (A. J. P. XXIII 21). But to return to our Stahl.>

Among the conquests of the comparative method Stahl counts the formation and original signification of the passive, the meaning of the tense stems and the augment, the separation of the injunctive from the imperative, the formation and original signification of the infinitive. But *modus totus noster est*. Here we can snap our fingers at other languages. In the Vedas there are only flotsam and jetsam subjunctives. In Latin subjunctive and optative are fused (A. J. P. XXV 481), and in Germanic the optative has thrust the subjunctive to the wall. In Greek we can afford to be independent.

Empiric and historic study, controlled by critical method, can give us external rules. Logic presses on to the fundamental forms of thought, to the inner laws. But language cannot be exhausted by logical processes. Its inmost secret can only be disclosed by psychological study. In fact the logical method leads to psychology. <The trouble is that in psychology we cannot shake off logic. The sting is in the tail of the word.>¹ 'The subjunctive', says Stahl, 'as the mood of the will, the subjunctive as the mood of a statement that is good for all time, the subjunctive as a prospective mood, all these subjunctives cannot be brought under the same category'. The indicatives of the real and the unreal exclude each other. The derived significations are not logical subdivisions, they are psychological ramifications. The optative, the mood of the will, passes over into a mood of assertion. 'It is a problem', says Stahl <but the problem is simplified for those who are born to the English language, who use our 'shall' and 'will', our 'would' and 'should' with the same shift, and think nothing of it. The wish which is father to the thought

¹ A Syntactician among the Psychologists. The Journal of Philosophy Vol. II, No. 4 (1905).

can hardly be told from its offspring and 'fancy' is now an optative, now an optative + *äv*>. As a specimen of the reverse process Stahl cites the future indicative used in the principal clause as a mood of assertion, in the subordinate clause as a mood of will. <But there are those who consider the future as originally modal, and maintain that the original signification survives as elsewhere in the dependent clause (S. C. G. 267). Translation is no test but the prevalence of the will future with the first person is worth noting.> Then, says Stahl, 'the mood becomes temporal when the subjunctive stands for a future' <a mere future, he should have said, for the subjunctive is necessarily future>. In the leading sentence the future is used as an imperative with the indicative negative, in the final relative clause with the imperative negative. The optative, which starts life as a wish of the speaker, becomes a notion of the speaker, then a notion of somebody else and so finally a gnomon of obliquity. <But there is a *salto mortale* between the potential and the *oratio obliqua* optative (A. J. P. XXVIII 206) in Greek, if not in German (A. J. P. XXVI 68) as there is a *salto mortale* between the negative of the optative with *äv* and the negative of the pure optative.>

Next we have to do with specializations. 'Die besonderen Arten des medialen Gebrauchs sind Spezialisierungen der allgemeinen Bedeutung des Mediums', says Stahl, blissfully unconscious that he is saying nothing more than 'Specialization is Specialization'. The process, he maintains, is from the general to the particular. <But the reverse view is tenable and not only tenable but fashionable. As Usener works up from the specialist gods, the transparent gods, to the opaque gods (A. J. P. XVII 361) so Morris and his school—a parallel suggested by Morris himself—are working up from specific manifestation to general principle. The specialist gods might be represented by the *πτώσεις ἰδίαί* and the opaque gods by the *πτώσεις κοιναί*. It is curious to watch the progress of doctrine and find that the progress is really refluxence. Take the cases. First comes chaos. Then the period of grand generalizations, of parisyllabic and imparisyllabic. Parisyllabic and imparisyllabic prove practically useless and the declensions multiply. There are ten in the Westminster Grammar of 1630. Then comes the era of the three declensions, doubtless hailed as a glorious advance, to be followed in our time by the further simplification into vowel and consonant declensions. But subdivisions become necessary so that the only scientific

method of handling the forms is to have as many declensions as there are stem-characteristics. And so in syntax the only scientific method of handling the accusative is to give all the nouns that are used in the accusative as Hübschmann has done for Zend (A. J. P. II 89). If this is not chaos from the teacher's point of view, it is a close approximation. And the same thing is true of the moods. There are as many subjunctives as there are frames of mind, and as many frames of mind as there are minds to frame.¹>

But Stahl belongs to the period, not yet closed, of basic meanings and he goes on to illustrate his doctrine of specialization by the optative with *ἄν*. The optative with *ἄν*, it seems, starts life as a general affirmation. Then it becomes a potential by which the predicate is represented as something possible, and finally conditional by which something is conditioned. <But the optative + *ἄν* can never represent 'objective' possibility. Potential and possible are not identical (A. J. P. XX 231); there is such a thing as *δυναμὴν ἄν*, such a thing as *possim*. There is a potentiality of possibility, and all optatives with *ἄν* are conditioned by personal conviction. The speaker sees an *ἄν* that others may not, cannot, will not see. The multiplication of categories gives a delightful exercise to the genetic grammarian, but it can hardly be called either a scientific advance or a practical advantage, and he who undertakes to translate Stahl into English will find that the distinguished grammarian has made classifications that can never mean anything except to a German.>

'Another thing to be considered', says Stahl, 'is the shifting of the sphere as when a verb of saying and thinking is used as a verb of will and *vice versa*'. Amen and amen. We all know that, and the grammars are all full of such things, but I will allow myself to remark that the categories are not always carefully delimited. So the verbs of reflection, such as *ἐνθυμεῖσθαι* and *λογίζεσθαι*, ought to have a place of their own and though practi-

¹ The frame of mind, the mental pulse, the state of digestion, the feeling that comes over one after a French *apéritif*, after an American cocktail, that feeling which suggests a stimulative subjunctive to match the stipulative subjunctive, the balancing between will and desire, the poor cat in the adage attitude,—all these subtle shades are subjective states that require a finer calculus than we have thus far at our disposal; and yet they all have their ample justification in the nature of things. Why should not the Greek and the Roman have as many moods as the Turk, and if these ancient languages fail to note by distinct forms all the various phases of emotion, why may we not supply them?' Oscillations and Nutations of Philological Studies, p. 10.

cally it is well to speak of a shift, the process is not simply a shift. Will is at the bottom of everything.¹ Call it *προαίρεσις* in the conscious stage, call it appetite in the unconscious stage. Absorption and appropriation, peristaltic movement and expulsion—that is the life of language as of everything else that lives.>

Then comes the question of the economics of language. Language has not a custom-made dress for every thought. <Sometimes she wears *ἀναξυρίδες*, sometimes *θύλακοι*.> *ὥς* is 'how', but it may serve as 'that' at a pinch (A. J. P. XIV 375). *εἰ εἶχε* is a logical or unreal condition. The context must decide. The utterance is colored by its surroundings. 'That is a wise economy', says Stahl. <The Greek was a thrifty soul and could not be expected to waste his oil and toil on framing this category and that, categories that are clearly recognized in languages commonly considered inferior to the Greek, and Stahl might have pointed out the shameful laziness that kept the Greek from giving gender to the persons of the verb as does the Hebrew. Stahl is no less anthropomorphic than the rest of us when we come to speak of language with a big L (A. J. P. XVIII 368). Language like the rest of us saves at one end and squanders at the other. In fact, Wunderlich makes 'Sparsamkeit' and 'Verschwendung' the basic principles of 'Umgangssprache', and it is a matter of notoriety that the Greek is perfectly lavish in his expenditure of the fairy money of the future (A. J. P. XXIII 128).>

And here Stahl insists, as we all insist, on the difference of the point of view, which is not to be confounded with the difference in the thing itself, and this is a matter to which he returns with wearisome iteration. The Galata tower is the same whether you look at it from the Pera side or the bridge side. The stick is the same whether you look at it endwise or otherwise. Future is future and past is past. 'There is even a great waste of acuteness', thinks Stahl, 'in manufacturing vital distinctions'. <Freedom shares the throne of law. *Δίκη ξύνεδρος* *Ζητὸς ἀρχαίους νόμους*, sums up the whole thing—Justice, Divine Freedom, Ancient Use and Wont.> We know all that. But 'all that' only means that the grammarian is fully prepared to ignore differences made by other grammarians and to emphasize those which he has established for himself. Stahl refuses to distinguish between *ὅπως* and

¹ A Syntactician among the Psychologists, l. c.

ὅπως ἄν, a distinction on which one Gildersleeve insists (A. J. P. IV 422; XXIII 12) cf. XXIV 394; and Gildersleeve declines to accept Stahl's categories of opt. + ἄν, as has just been set forth. The use of the aorist with definite numbers, which I consider a natural function of the aorist (S. C. G. 243), Stahl considers a freedom or rather an economy. 'It is not necessary', he says, 'to put the durative element in the form of the verb when it is indicated in the numeral'. That is one phase of his dislike to the use of the word 'complexive', in connexion with the aorist, whereas I am as fond of 'complexive' as if I had originated it. A participle may be at the same time temporal, conditional and causal,—that is to a German who always has trouble with the participle as I have shown elsewhere (A. J. P. IX 136), Stahl himself being one of my exemplars (A. J. P. XIX 463; XX 352). It is curious how we allow necessities of translation to interfere with the direct vision of a foreign language, how we multiply categories based chiefly on the auxiliary verbs employed in turning Greek and Latin into English (A. J. P. XIX 231, 351).

One bit of arbitrariness is evidently too much for Stahl. It is too much for most of us, and that is the restriction of the oblique optative to the sequence of the preterites, apart, of course, from instances of assimilation so-called. 'This restriction cannot lie', he says, 'in the nature of the *modus obliquus*, as we see by Latin, so that the only reason must be a psychological one'. Psychology is a fine covert from a storm of questions. In my judgment there is no woe upon us to explain this phenomenon by comparative syntax. These oblique relations belong to the after-growths and the ethnic grammarian has the right to pursue the search for the explanation within the range of the special language. The post-Homeric vanishing of the futural subjunctive in the leading clause Stahl attributes to the competition of the future indicative, which rendered the futural subjunctive unnecessary. Now the futural subjunctive being largely aoristic gave a shade which the future indicative does not give, and I should say that the real competitor is the optative with ἄν which is largely used to make up for the indeterminateness of the future, when it ceased to be a mood as it has ceased to be in the leading clause. Unfortunately Stahl does not believe in the modal nature of the future as I do, and he would not say with me that the future indicative has not succeeded in ousting the more exact expressions of temporal relations such as ὅταν and ἐπειδὴν with present and

aorist subjunctive (A. J. P. XXIII 247), where the futural subjunctive holds its own. The subordinate sentence is the Ararat in the flood of change here as elsewhere.

The personification we call language being feminine picks and chooses. Being a woman she has often no other than a woman's reason and thinks it so because she thinks it so (A. J. P. XXIV 397; XXVIII 253), and Stahl sees a certain caprice in the restoration of the subordinate imperative to such phrases as *οἷσθ' ὁ δρᾶσον*. It is feminine caprice, if one may judge by school girls' English. 'Do you know what let's do' has been a pet illustration of mine for many a decennium. Then again give Dame Language an inch and she takes an ell like the rest of her sex. The original accusative and infinitive was simple enough. There was the accusative, there was the infinitive, a legitimate accusative, a legitimate infinitive. There is no more trouble about that than about the accusative with the dative. Then came the accusativus cum infinitivo. That is a different story, that is a *solus cum sola* story and the combination is so close that all manner of grammatical scandal is afloat and one is fain to cry out with Cicero: *quid tibi cum Caelio, quid cum homine adulescentulo?* The absolute participles were not absolute originally. What is absolute in one period is not absolute at another (Pindar I. E. cxii). The unreal imperfect had originally a smaller territory (Goodwin, M. and T., R. E. 435).

Another category is that of assimilation or levelling, comparable with matching ribbons, if we dare to linger longer in the feminine sphere. The most notorious example is that presented by the behaviour of the relative. In the syntax of the verb Stahl bids us distinguish between mere formal assimilation and logical assimilation. His examples of purely formal assimilation are the use of the optative after optative + *ἄν* or the pure optative and the participle after *ᾧστε* under the influence of another participle (A. J. P. VII 172). Are they merely formal? His example of the logical assimilation is the use of the indicative in sentences dependent on an unreal indicative in which, as I set forth long ago, the first unreality is merely parenthetical to the second (A. J. P. IV 434). 'All which shows', says Stahl, 'the importance of combining psychology with logic'. < 'All which shows', how easy it is to dress up familiar facts in fancy costume. Put the phenomena in other language and you seem to get something brand new. I have recently read that the queer French

genius to whom I referred in the beginning of this article (p. 258) had engraved on his seal the English words 'Too late'. Perhaps some English genius will engrave on his seal 'Trop tard'. One envies the virginal state of mind that can be impressed with such shifts from one language to another.>

I have spent some time on Stahl's 'Methodology': I shall make or try to make shorter work of his 'Grundbegriffe'. After these chapters are finished there will remain only 800 pages to be considered, but 'Fear not, little flock', most of these 800 can be despatched by simple references; for Stahl repeats a great deal, amplifies a great deal, and multiplies categories unnecessarily. It takes the courage of a syntactical specialist to make his way through this mass of material, I had well nigh said 'wade'. But 'wade' would imply that syntax is a morass (A. J. P. XXIII 106; XXVIII 487) and I do not wish to be disrespectful. Only one absurd distich comes up to my mind from Goethe's *Wahrheit und Dichtung*.

Ober Yssel. Viel Morast
Macht das gute Land verhasst.

But after all there is 'gutes Land' in Stahl.

Under the head of 'Grundbegriffe' Stahl extends the definition of syntax. 'Syntax ist die Lehre von der Bedeutung der Wortformen und ihrer Verbindung im und zum Satze'. This definition may serve to save the face of the syntactician who usually employs syntax as a rag-bag for holding odds and ends of linguistic observations. But syntax as the theory 'of the formation and combination of sentences' (S. C. G. 1) involves the determination of the constituents of the sentence and of the connecting links of the sentence. A definition is not an inventory of contents. 'Im Anfang war der Satz', says a high authority and properly understood the theory of the sentence will serve, though Krüger rebelled against that definition. What is the verb? But here my English fails me and I must transfer to my seal Stahl's own language. The verb according to Stahl is 'der sprachliche Ausdruck für den Erscheinungsbegriff an sich' in contradistinction to the substantive. 'Das Substantivum', he says, 'bezeichnet einen Begriff als Substanz, das Verbum als Erscheinung an sich', whereas the adjective gives 'die konstante an der Substanz haftende Erscheinung <die wir> Eigenschaft nennen'. The 'Erscheinung' can present itself as a

'Substanz' and then we have the infinitive, the verbal substantive. It may present itself as a quality and then it becomes a verbal substantive. Then we have the story of adjectives used as substantives and substantives used as adjectives. Nothing is gained by all this would-be metaphysic from my point of view and if I should undertake to discuss Stahl, I might be accused of misrepresenting his theory. What I am concerned with is the registry of sensations, the analysis of sensations. Sensation is a current and the *ῥῆμα* is a *ῥεύμα*. We are in the realm of the Herakleitean flux. Stahl is welcome to his Parmenidean *ἔν*. Fix the verb, it becomes a noun. Melt the noun, it becomes a verb. The verbal noun is a noun that deliquesces. The verbal adjective is a verb that clings, that deposits a film on the substantive. I have actually called it a skin (A. J. P. XX 352; XXIII 259), and I am not sorry that I have done so. I could not live without metaphor, nor can any one else (A. J. P. XXIX 239).

So I am not going to follow Stahl's criticism of current definitions and the defence of his own. One trouble is the incommensurability of German and English. Distinctions that may work perfectly well in German will not work in English. So under 'Erscheinung' he distinguishes 'Tätigkeit' and 'Zustand', 'activity' or 'action' and 'condition'. That might pass, but under 'Tätigkeit' he makes a distinction between 'Handlung und Tat'. 'Handlung' involves consciousness. 'Der Jäger erzählt von den Taten, aber nicht von den Handlungen seines Hundes; in der Fabel aber handelt der Fuchs klug'. We do not make the distinction in English, and forty years ago I thought it expedient to make special provision for animals considered as agents, 'a cane non magno saepe tenetur aper'. The rule was sorely needed as appears from a Latin Reader made up from Livy by one of the leading contributors to Harper's Latin Dictionary, in which the world was informed that 'Romulus et Remus lupa nutriti sunt'. Surely the taste that could distinguish between 'he-wolf' and 'she-wolf' as articles of diet must have been as subtle as the London alderman's with his 'callipash' and 'callipee'.

'Tätigkeit' and 'Handlung' defy the English language, but we can manage 'Ereignis' as 'event' and 'Vorgang' as 'process'. Against 'Zeitwort' for 'verb' Stahl contends valiantly, charges a paper screen and demolishes it utterly, as Mommsen says somewhere of Cicero. By 'Zeitwort' one would naturally understand

an adverb of time and the victory was won long ago. Apollonios Dyskolos finds no favor in Stahl's eyes. His definition is an inventory from which the participle is omitted, and moreover it applies only to Greek. Unsatisfactory to Stahl is 'Aussagewort.' The verb is not the only thing that predicates. Every word says something. Especially offensive to Stahl is the definition of the verb as a 'Tätigkeitsäusserung'. All these are contemptuously rejected in favor of 'Erscheinung', which I dare not translate phenomenon because of Aratos' Phaenomena, and what is to become of 'Erscheinung' in the dark? Shall we call it 'manifestation'? But there is *λανθάνω*, a most excellent verb. Is all this hopelessly frivolous? Not quite so frivolous as it seems. Definitions are much more easily dodged than metaphors. Is *σκιά* abstract or concrete? My answer would be. It is oxytone like *αίμασι* *ἀλιά*, and the rest of the 'concrete' *ιά*'s which cast it.

Subject and predicate are necessary to every logical sentence. The so-called copula, the *verbum substantivum* is really a predicate. Every grammarian uses it and every grammarian abuses it. Stahl differs only in his vehemence and his claims to greater consistency. Touch not, taste not, handle not the unclean thing. It is a false, a fallacious expression. False it may be, but fallacious it is not. '*ἄριστον μὲν ἴδωρ* is an incomplete thing', says Stahl. Attribute cannot be predicate. True, a logical sentence may be involved in an expression. *αἰβοῖ* may suggest *ἀπέπτυσα*, *ψύττα* may suggest *φθείρον*, but that does not constitute a sentence any more than the expletive one indulges in when reading a tiresome grammatical treatise can be considered a judicial sentence. But the interjection is multisignificant. Everything depends on the tone, the gesture. *ἦ Ξανθία* is interpreted by *βάδιζε δεῦρο*. The vocative is not a sentence, and Stahl, though he names no names, is fighting against those who wish to extend the area of the sentence (A. J. P. XXIII 6). As to the omission of the forms of *εἶναι*, Stahl says that the frequent occurrence of the omission in the oldest language makes it not unlikely that it goes back to primeval time before *εἶναι* had lost its force, not to say had become a copula, and before there was any distinction between adjective as predicate and adjective as attribute.¹ <Then why insist so

¹ According to some scholars (see J. van Ginteren, l. c., p. 110), the primitive copula is a pronoun, nay, *εἰμί* itself has been claimed as a verbalised pronoun. The Hebrew omission of the copula and the reinforcement of the

rigidly as Stahl has done on the difference between attribute and predicate? If we are to go back to primeval times, the predicate might be considered as an accusative of the object effected as in Arabic, a significant fact which I gleaned from Ewald *Lehrb.*, § 279, 1855, many, many years ago.¹ In that case the concord of subject and adjective predicate would be a mere assimilation. After the familiar ellipsis of forms of εἶναι (A. J. P. XXIII 7) Stahl takes up the ellipsis of verbs of motion, of verbs of saying and doing, of verbs involved in the context. All this may be considered elementary, but supplying ellipses may be dangerous sport, as Stahl himself has shown, when he follows Kühner and Goodwin in paralleling οὐχ ὅπως (p. 780) and οὐχ ὅτι (A. J. P. XX 228; XXVII 234).

The great division of sentences is into 'Urteilssätze' and 'Begehrungssätze' and the 'Urteilssätze' are further divided into 'Aussagesätze' and 'Fragesätze'. 'Opinion' and 'Desire'. Why not the other way? It is the common way, the genetic way. And the question is not a sentence at all unless it borrows its answer. Word questions and sentence-questions, simple and disjunctive questions, questions proper and questions rhetorical, principal sentence and dependent sentence, coördination and subordination, simple, expanded and compound sentences, require no comment. Subject sentences and object sentences are comprised under the name of the substantive sentence. They stand in the same relation to the leading verb as do the corresponding nominal forms, and include adverbial relative sentences, the adverb representing time, place, manner and cause.

To causality Stahl devotes especial attention, as well he may (A. J. P. XXVIII 353), and causal sentences are distinguished thus: 1. Hypothetical (des vorausgesetzten Grundes). 2. Causal proper (des vorhandenen Grundes). 3. Concessive (des nicht wirkenden Grundes). 4. Consecutive (des umgekehrten Grundes). 5. Final sentences (der erstrebten Folge oder Absicht). I keep the German because 'Grund' is susceptible of a varied translation into English and because Germans play tricks with technical Latin terms. So the first translation of 'Voraussetzung' is 'pre-

identical relation by the pronoun (compare the use of οὗτος) are familiar facts. No one who has ever read can forget the ring of I Kings 18, 39.

יְהוָה הוּא הָאֱלֹהִים

¹ See now J. van Ginteren, p. 112.

sumption' and lo! we have a subdivision of the hypothetical sentence which we call conditional sentence into the 'presumptive' and 'conditional' sentence. Stahl is evidently proud of this distinction and he takes half a page to provide for the 'presumptive' group in which the leading verb involves the notion of will, the ἀναμένειν εἰάν group, the *expectare si* group, in which ἀναμένειν and *expectare* denote suspended action (μέλλειν). These sentences have been roughly classed by some as interrogative sentences. Against this Goodwin protested years ago (M. and T., R. E., §§ 493, 680), and on the corresponding Latin phenomenon Gaffiot has recently written a special treatise. The thing is plain enough and there is no need of Stahl's division. It is merely a matter of involved condition. At any rate 'presumptive' would not be a happy term in English, and I wish Stahl's English translator joy in rendering the German phrases 'in dem Fall' for the conditional and 'für den Fall' for the 'presumptive'. In idiomatic English we should use 'in case' for both and the German distinction, though comprehensible, seems to me more or less manufactured as 'in case' and 'against the case', 'in the event' and 'against the event' would be in English. 'Proviso' will not answer for 'presumptive', because 'proviso' carries with it an element of purpose. Compare the so-called conditional ὥστε (μή), ἐφ' ᾧ (μή). At all events, it seems to me a mistake to make such a category basic. Concessive sentences Stahl divides into those in which the inefficient cause is represented as real, and in those in which it is assumed as real. The distinction between concessive and adversative, to represent the two classes καὶ εἰ and εἰ καί, seems to me more practical. But no two grammarians will agree on these points and I will pass over Stahl's discussion of the difference between 'Nebensatz' and 'abhängiger Satz'. 'All dependent sentences', he says, 'are subordinate sentences, but all subordinate sentences are not dependent, such as relative clauses, the form of which does not depend on that of the leading verb.'

Important for Stahl's system is the division of subordinate sentences into Synthetic, those that have an inner nexus with the leading clause and Parathetic, those, the forms of which are not determined by the leading verb. To the former class belongs, f. i., ὥστε μή with inf., to the latter ὥστ' οὐ with ind.

The primitive nature of parataxis is recognized by Stahl, as we have seen, and the later development of hypotaxis, but Stahl is

not parataxis mad. That peculiar form of *furore* is becoming obsolete (A. J. P. XXIII 253). But I am not quite satisfied with his statement. 'There is', he says, 'a widespread use of parataxis in Homer, and, though it gradually receded, it was never quite given up and even lent itself occasionally to rhetorical effect'. 'Never quite given up' and 'rhetorical effect' are not scientific expressions. One craves exact figures.

Transitive verb in the language of Apollonios is ῥῆμα ἀλλοπαθές, intransitive ῥῆμα αὐτοπαθές. The ordinary definition of transitive and intransitive Stahl finds as unsatisfactory as I do and have always done (cf. LG³ 213 R.), but he bids us distinguish carefully between the accusative of the object after the transitive verb and the accusative of the content after the intransitive verb, so that he is evidently working a different theory of the accusative than that which makes the outer object only a different phase of the inner object. That is the theory to which I have been addicted for half a century (LG³, p. 208 Note). Whether I owe it to Bernhardt or not, I cannot tell at this distance of time. Some one, I forget who, gives the credit of it to Erdmann, who is relatively of yesterday (A. J. P. XIV 372). Stahl's leading example of the combination of the accusative as the nearer, and the dative as the more remote, object is κεφαλὴν τινι ἀποτέμνειν. The example is not well chosen. With such a verb as ἀποτέμνειν, we should almost inevitably have the genitive (cf. A. J. P. XXIII 232).

Impersonal verbs (ἀπρόσωπα) ought to be called, according to Stahl, unipersonal verbs and he considers it a contradiction in terms to speak of these verbs as subjectless after the manner of most recent grammarians. He agrees with Apollonios in maintaining that σωφρονεῖν προσήκει has a subject just as much as σωφροσύνη προσήκει or to use Priscian's illustration 'bonum est legere' is only another form of 'bona est lectio', LG³ 422 Note 1, and compare Lodge, A. J. P. XVI 372. The whole controversy turns on the conscious or sub-conscious survival of the original dative sense of the infinitive which it is hard to maintain in view of Il. 2, 455: τοῖσι δ' ἄφαρ πόλεμος γλυκίων γένετ' ἢ νέεσθαι and 10, 174: ὀλεθρος ἢ βιῶναι in which the inf. could not have well been other to the Homeric singer than it was to Euripides, Eur. Med. 542: μήτε χρυσὸς μήτ' ὑμνῆσαι. The articular infinitive is, of course, a flat surrender. We are now luckily out of the forecourt of the Syntax of the Greek Verb, where I always kick my heels impa-

tiently. There is so little to be gained by all this would-be profound discussion for the real appreciation of the things that interest me. In my day the German professor, no matter what the subject was, used to give in his preliminary lecture a specimen of his house-philosophy and present to the admiring novice his theory of the universe and said admiring novice used to wonder at the 'mossy heads', who failed to jot down these outgivings of a great thinker. Now I am an ancient of days myself, and ought to have known better than to spend so much time on these preliminaries. The real business will begin with The Tenses and Moods. But before attacking them, let me say a few words about Stahl's presentation of

THE VOICES.

Of course, what we call in English after the old French grammars the Voices, Stahl calls Genera—the Greek γένη—a term based on a fancied resemblance to the genders, a positively indecent nomenclature. Compare ὑπτιος, *supinus*, and in another sphere *pathicus*. Things that are nowadays the common property of all school grammars, it will not be necessary to mention; as, f. i., the fact that the passive is a matter of function rather than of form, that there is but one distinctively passive form and that of seemingly late origin—the -θησομαι future. To the lone example of a distinctly fut. pass. form in Homer *μυγήσεσθαι* Il. 10, 365 (S. C. G. 168) Stahl adds *δαήσεαι*, Od. 3, 187, 325.

The intransitive use of transitive verbs is illustrated by a long list of verbs of motion that belong to this category, arranged for the most part alphabetically, for which we may be thankful just as we are thankful for the glimmer of an alphabetic arrangement in the fragments of Theognis. In so many other chapters the only order is the Teutonic order of Kraut und Rüben. Indeed, the lack of a definite and uniform principle of arrangement is one of the marked defects of the book from my point of view; and if any one will be at the pains of ordering the examples according to the departments of literature, he will appreciate the difficulty of a stylistic syntax. It is only when Stahl happens to take an interest in a special quest that the historical or artistic side is considered in mustering the proof texts. The transitive use of the intransitive, the causative use of the active, have only short lists. The latter it might have been well to emphasize because some scholars have considered the use as belonging in a special manner to the middle

(Pindar I. E. ciii; S. C. G. 144). The evasion of responsibility in most of the verbs in which the active is used for the passive (S. C. G., 172) Stahl has not noticed or not thought worth noticing. On the use of the future middle form of active verbs he has not been able to throw any light (A. J. P. III 227). What earthly help is it to say that the reason is to be sought in the fact that in many verbs the distinction between active and middle has vanished and that *ἔσομαι* has set a bad example? '*βήσομαι*', he thinks, 'is due to differentiation from *βήσω*'. The problem remains where it was.

The middle with its general reflexiveness is subdivided by Stahl into various classes. What is usually called the direct reflexive, roughly equivalent to active + acc. Stahl calls the objective middle, which would not answer for English in which the objective case covers both acc. and dative, and in which there is a merging of forms. Whoever translates Stahl should be alive to these differences of idiom. English uses the reflexive more sparingly than German. The German reflexive is much lighter than the English which has practically discarded the simple personal pronouns for the cumbrous self-compounds, so that we use instead intransitives and passives much more than the German does, the passives, in fact, riotously in the face of heredity (A. J. P. XXIII 18). The Greek is, of course, still lighter than the German and the differences of idiom lead to analyses that may be superfluous for this and that idiom, but are after all not without interest. So in the long alphabetical list of 'objective middles' few will be found that do not involve a natural action (S. C. G. 146; cf. A. J. P. XXVIII 235), and the few that do not may be otherwise conceived. To Stahl and his fellow-Germans *ἀπόλλυσθαι* may be 'sich zu Grunde richten', but the first and most natural German rendering seems to be 'zu Grunde gehen'. To the Romans it was *perire* not *se perdere*. To us it is 'perish' not 'ruin one's self'. And so the other list of verbs of feeling, from *αἰσχύνεσθαι* to *τέρπεσθαι*, which are for the most part passively conceived in English. 'I am ashamed', 'I shame' (Shakespeare), 'I take shame to myself,' present different facets.

The indirect reflexive Stahl calls 'das Medium der Beteiligung'. The Latin is *sibi*, *in suum usum*; in German as in English the rendering is often the possessive pronoun. There is a long demonstration of *ἄρχειν* and *ἄρχεσθαι*, *ποιεῖν* and *ποιεῖσθαι*. Thuk. 6, 58, 2 he reads *πομπὰς ποιεῖσθαι* for *πομπὰς ποιεῖν* and Plat.

Legg. 865 A he drops τῶν ἀρχόντων in consonance with the general principle ; for he is a uniformitarian, when it suits him.

The causative middle is treated at much greater length than the causative active for which Stahl had curtly referred us to the context. ἐστεφανώσατο Pind. O. 7, 81 and στεφανώσμενος O. 7, 15 are no more causative than O. 14, 24 ἐστεφάνωσε χαίταν.

There is no disputing the value of these lists, but the interpretation of the differences between active and middle is in many cases, if I may say so, not so much grammatical as lexical ; that is to say, the grammatical definition does not determine the practical use, the conventional use. So γῆμαι of the man, γήμασθαι of the woman. We might insist on a uniform translation of 'marry' for the man, and 'get married' for the woman, but the antique bride did not rope in her husband as the modern bride does hers and the *in suum usum* formula does not help.

A further division is made for the local middle, the 'towards', 'from' and 'with' middle, illustrated by μεταπέμπεσθαι and ἐφέλκεσθαι, ἀποπέμπεσθαι and ἀποσείεσθαι, ἄγεσθαι and φέρεσθαι. To be sure, the middle in all these verbs is not compulsory and the use of the active where the middle would be customary produces what I have ventured to call an aristocratic disdain of effect (S. C. G. 148). With the ἄγεσθαι and φέρεσθαι verbs Stahl classes σκοπεῖσθαι, λογιζέσθαι, ἐνθυμείσθαι. 'This conception', he thinks, 'is borne out by the Homeric ἐνὶ φρεσὶ βάλλεο σῆσιν, φράζετο θυμῷ and the like'. He may be right, but a great deal of mischief has been wrought by the appeal to the fuller expression. The fuller expression does not necessarily give the conception of the briefer expression, just as in the theory of the cases it does not follow by any means that we have a whence-conception with the genitive wherever we can give a whence-turn by a preposition such as ἐξ or ἀπó.

The reciprocal middle comes to its rights in Stahl, but while he takes ἐρίζεσθαι as a reciprocal (see my note on Pind. O. 1, 58 : ἐρίζεται rendered necessary by the remark in Fennell's first ed.), he excludes ἀγωνίζεσθαι, μάχεσθαι, μάρνασθαι, because 'mutuality' is not involved, as if it did not take two to make a quarrel.

And now we come to what I would fain call the drip-pan middle, the πανδέκτης middle, the middle that is put at the bottom to catch the drippings of the other uses as the ablative is put to catch the drippings of the other cases. It is called the intensive middle, the dynamic middle. We have five *chevaux de frise* pages on the subject and after all the catego-

rising, individual authors baffle us. There is, f. i., *παρέχειν* and *παρέχεται*. If you read certain authors you are ready to formulate. *ὁ παρέχων* shirks responsibility for disagreeable things, *ὁ παρεχόμενος* takes the credit for agreeable things, but alas! Plato who after all writes Jove-like Greek sends the distinction *ἐς κόρακας*. In short the dynamic middle might as well be called the ethical middle and spelling it out with the help of 'out of one's own means' and the like is in many cases a mere concession to the mania for explaining the reflexive notion, which is often so faint that one forgives Curtius for his untenable explanation of *-μαι*, *-σαι*, *-ται*. After one has done one's best, one must needs fall back on the way of the language. *λαβεῖν* may be rendered to 'grip', and *λαβεῖσθαι* 'to get one's grip', the *-εὔειν* and *-εὔεσθαι* may be differentiated, *πολιτεύειν* 'to be a citizen', *πολιτεύεσθαι* 'to play one's part as a citizen', but *ἔπεισθαι* like *sequi* does not yield to us a reflexive sense without forcing, and after all is said and done we have to admit, as Stahl has done, that the language is capricious in such matters. We translate *ιδεῖν* 'see', *ιδέσθαι* 'to see with one's own eyes', an overtranslation as *ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ὁρᾶν* shows, but if there is such virtue in *ιδέσθαι*, why not in *ιδόμενος*? Ah! the verse. Like the rest of us Stahl has to go into bankruptcy. Translation will not suffice. 'The middle may be quite appropriate', he says, 'and yet when there is no essential difference between the middle and the active the <frivolous> author may go to work <or rather to play> and use the active'. And the whole thing winds up with a chapter on the difference between the *-κα* and the strong perfects, the use of the aorist active (e. g., *ἔδρακον*) side by side with the present middle (e. g., *δέρκομαι*) and the tendency of the sigmatic aorist to the causative signification, *ἔστησα*(*ἔστην*). All this is very disappointing in a work that was to have illuminated the whole track of our studies. The book will be a God-send to those who like to write about Greek syntax without reading Greek, and every Greek scholar will welcome the material, but the specialist in syntax who is really seeking light and who has worked through the whole period covered by Stahl will not be edified by the false points he has made and the ruthless way in which he breaks off those that he has not developed himself.

Then follows the chapter on the medio-passives, the future middle used as a passive and the small group of verbs in which the aor.-middle is used passively. Even in Attic *ἐσχόμεν* appears as a passive, *ἐσκέθην* being late. But I will spare myself and my

reader the trouble of going through these and other familiar categories which Stahl's wider definition of syntax has brought into the range of his study.

A word or two as to the passive. Theoretically the passive ought to be formed from transitive verbs only with an accusative object, and he might have added that the word 'transitive' itself suggests the limitation. A transitive verb is a verb that passes over to a passive rather than one that passes over to an object. But with a lordliness that reminds one of English, the passive can be used with a subject which with the active would appear as a genitive object rarely or a dative object not infrequently.

But Stahl's rule seems to me incautiously worded (p. 69): 'Tritt zu einem persönlichen Dativ dieser Art im Aktivum ein sachliches Objekt im Akkusativ hinzu so bleibt dieses bei der Verwandlung ins Passivum'. Strictly construed this would warrant us in saying, **δίδονται πλοῦτον οἱ Ἕλληνες*. Even English rebels against such a liberty, or at least is uneasy under it (A. J. P. XXIII 18; cf. II 92). The few examples he can rake up outside of the famous *ἀποτμηθέντες τὰς κεφαλὰς* group, which does not count (A. J. P. XXV 110) are to be subsumed under the accusative of the inner object and are nearly all Thukydean and on the same lines as the famous or infamous *ἐπιτετραμμένοι τὴν φυλακὴν* = *ἐπιτροπήν* (S. C. G. 175).

The use of the passive aorist as the passive of the middle as well as the passive of the active (e. g., *ῥέθην*), the use of the deponent middle and passive and the variations of prose and poetry in these respects—these are matters that seem to clog syntax proper, and the conclusion that Stahl reaches that there is no hard and fast rule about the use of the voices will not console the student who has religiously worked through the long lists that can only be mastered by a personal familiarity with the living and moving body of the language.

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